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This paper presents a DGE model in which aggregate price level
inertia is generated endogenously by the optimizing behaviour of price
setting …rms. All the usual sources of inertia are absent here ie., all
…rms are simultaneously free to change their price once every period
and face no adjustment costs in doing so. Despite this, the model
generates persistent movements in aggregate output and in‡ation in
response to a nominal shock. This occurs because …rms temper their
desire to raise prices after a positive money growth shock in order to
learn and lower future costs.
Key words: Endogenous price stickiness, Business Cycles, In‡a-
tion, Nominal rigidities, Learning-by-doing, Propagation mechanisms.
11 Introduction
There has been a recent surge in interest in dynamic general equilibrium
models in which …rms adjust their prices infrequently. Many of these models
employ one of two classes of time-dependent pricing rules associated with
Taylor (1999) and Calvo (1983).1 In the former, prices are set for a given
number of periods and the opportunity to adjust prices is staggered so that
not all …rms can adjust prices in any given period. In the latter, …rms face
a …xed probability of being able to adjust prices in each period. While the
duration for which prices are …xed is uncertain for an individual …rm, the
average duration is known and in the aggregate a constant fraction of all
…rms will adjust prices every period as in the Taylor model.
While these models have had some success in generating empirically plau-
sible business cycles in response to monetary shocks the pricing arrangements
embedded in the models are theoretically unappealing.2 This theoretical
weakness arises from the exogenous nature of the pricing arrangements im-
posed upon …rms which determine both the length of time for which prices
cannot be re-optimized as well as the degree of synchronization among …rms.
This can have important consequences for the ability of these models to pre-
dict the response of the economy to changes in the economic environment,
especially to changes in monetary policy. While one might expect that the
optimal pricing arrangements of …rms may respond to policy, they cannot in
the model. Since the duration of price stickiness and the degree of staggering
of pricing decisions in‡uence the response of aggregate variables in the model
one may not end up with sensible predictions regarding how the economy will
respond to these changes.
Staggered price setting models were popular despite this well understood
weakness because staggering was viewed as a critical element, along with
long periods of price stickiness, in generating an inertial response of the price
level and aggregate output to monetary shocks. However recent work has
questioned the centrality of these two phenomena in propagating nominal
shocks. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) forcefully argue that stagger-
ing of pricing decisions is ine¤ective in propagating nominal shocks beyond
the assumed duration for which prices are …xed. In addition, Christiano,
1There are too many sticky price dynamic general equilibrium models to list here. Some
examples are King and Watson (1996), Yun (1996), Cho et al (1997), Chari et al. (2000),
Bergin and Feenstra (2000), Erceg et al. (2000) Huang and Liu (2001).
2See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) for example.
2Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that price staggering is not crucial to
generating realistic impulse responses. Finally Bils and Klenow (2005) show
that on average prices change much more quickly in US data than has been
assumed in the sticky price literature.3
The goal of this paper is to show that it is not necessary to retain either
unappealing element in order to generate inertia in the aggregate price level.
To make this point forcefully, the paper restricts the amount of exogenous
price rigidity to one period, i.e., all …rms set prices simultaneously at the
beginning of each period. None the less, the aggregate price level will adjust
slowly to a money growth shock because all …rms optimally choose to adjust
their prices slowly4. In the standard one-period sticky price model, …rms
wish to adjust prices in proportion with the expected change in marginal
costs next period. The novel feature of this paper is that …rms may actually
choose to adjust prices less than proportionally to expected marginal cost.
As a result the model can generate prices that adjust very slowly. Since the
…rm could in principle adjust fully to expected future in‡ation after the …rst
period, any subsequent sluggishness in the price level is endogenous. Indeed,
in the standard one period sticky price model, almost all of the adjustment
in a …rm’s price occurs in the …rst period after the shock.
The key mechanism that is responsible for this novel feature is learning-
by-doing. Firms desire to accumulate production experience because it is an
input in the production technology and reduces future costs.5 Accumulation
of additional experience requires additional production. In a monopolisti-
cally competitive environment, …rms must lower prices in order to sell this
extra output. As a result, the presence of learning-by-doing may lead …rms
to set lower prices compared to standard models in which they equate ex-
pected marginal revenue with expected marginal cost. Moreover, any event
that leads to an increase in the demand for the …rm’s product (such as a
money growth shock), creates a favorable environment for learning because
the demand curve is more responsive to a change in price. Essentially, a unit
reduction in price yields more bang for the buck by generating more pro-
duction, more experience and greater future cost reductions. By itself, this
3Bils and Klenow suggest that half of the prices studied lasted no more than 4.3 months
which is much shorter than the assumed duration of price rigidity (typically about 12
months) in the literature.
4This is not induced by imposing menu costs on the …rms.
5See Arrow (1962) and especially Rosen (1972) for early discussions of learning-by-doing
as a by-product of production experience.
3mechanism makes …rms want to lower prices when the economy is hit with
an unexpected increase in the growth rate of money. In addition, the usual
mechanism is in place:higher expected in‡ation and hence higher marginal
costs lead …rms to want to raise prices. The net e¤ect of these two forces
yield prices that increase less than expected increases in marginal cost. A
further reason that prices rise slowly is the e¤ect of learning-by-doing on
costs. The accumulated production experience lowers real costs and acts to
dampen the increase in nominal marginal costs.
The modelling of …rm-level learning closely follows the speci…cation in
Cooper and Johri (2002) which introduces an additional input in the pro-
duction technology referred to as organizational capital6. The accumulation
of organizational capital depends on past production with the property that
recent production contributes more tothe stock of organizational capital than
does older production. There is a vast empirical literature that documents
the pervasive presence of learning-by-doing e¤ects in the economy. Some re-
cent evidence and references to other studies can be found in Thornton and
Thompson (2001). There is less work on the idea that older production ex-
perience is less valuable than recent experience in reducing costs. One recent
study of this phenomenon is Benkard (2000). Cooper and Johri also present
both aggregate and plant level estimates of the speci…c form of learning-by-
doing assumed in this paper.
The e¤ectiveness of learning-by-doing in generating inertia in the aggre-
gate price level is demonstrated in the context of a dynamic general equi-
librium model with real money balances in preferences. Simulations from
a linearized version of the model, calibrated to the US economy show that
the model is capable of generating considerable inertia in the aggregate price
level. The model is also very successful in generating additional persistence
in output dynamics which is reminiscent of the results in Cooper and Johri.
There are few previous studies that look at the impact of learning-by-
doing on economic ‡uctuations.7 The closest to this paper is work by Cooper
and Johri (2002) who show that learning-by-doing is extremely e¤ective at
propagating technology shocks in a real business cycle framework. Cooper
and Johri use a representative agent framework and are agnostic about the
issue of who actually learns from past production: workers or …rms, and
6Prescott and Visscher (1980) o¤er some interpretations of organizational capital. See
also Atkeson and Kehoe (2001).
7There is a larger literature on the impact of learning-by-doing on economic growth with
an emphasis on learning externalities. See Stokey (1988) or Romer (1986) for example.
4thus o¤er no account of possible decentralizations. In complementary work,
Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002) focus solely on learning that is embod-
ied in workers and is fully captured in wages. They estimate the aggregate
learning rate for the US using data from the PSID and incorporate this into
a dynamic general equilibrium model with real shocks. They too are able
to generate a persistent response of output to real shocks. A related litera-
ture studies the impact of learning externalities in dynamic general equilib-
rium models. Cooper and Johri (1997) show that these are very e¤ective at
propagating technology and preference shocks while Cook (1999) investigates
nominal shocks. While potentially very important, externalities are ignored
in this paper to focus on the impact of internal learning-by-doing on pricing
decisions.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 discusses the calibration
of key parameters, section 4 presents the simulation results. The …nal section
concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes a monetary economy populated by many identical, in-
…nitely lived consumers. The economy closely resembles that in Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2000) with the major departure occurring in the technolog-
ical environment of …rms to incorporate learning-by-doing. Each period, the
economy …nds itself in one of …nitely many states, st: Let st = (s0;:::;st) be
the history of these states of the world. Along with labour and a good that is
used both for consumption and investment, the commodities in the economy
are money, a continuum of intermediate goods, and organizational capital.
There are a large number of …nal good producers who behave compet-
itively and use the following technology for converting intermediate goods










Each period they choose inputs Yi(st) for all i 2 [0;1]; and output Y (st)








5subject to (1) where P(st) denotes the price of the …nal good at history
st;while Pi(st¡1) is the price paid for the ith intermediate good in period t.
Note that these prices are set before the realization of the period t shock.











The zero pro…t condition can be used to infer the level of …nal goods











There are a large number of intermediate goods producers, indexed by the
letter i who operate in a Dixit-Stiglitz style imperfectly competitive economy.
Each such producer produces intermediate goods with a technology subject







where Ni(st) is the amount of labor hired, Ki(st); the amount of physical
capital hired by the …rm to produce output, Yi(st) and A(st) is a common
term governing the level of total factor productivity. In addition to these con-
ventional inputs, the …rm carries a stock of organizational capital, Hi(st¡1)
which is an input in the production technology. Organizational capital refers
to the information accumulated by the …rm in the process of past produc-
tion regarding how best to organize its production activities and deploy its
inputs.8 As a result, the higher the level of organizational capital, the more
productive the …rm. The production function is increasing in all three inputs.






with © increasing in both arguments. Here all producers begin life with a
positive and identical endowment of organizational capital. This form of
8Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) model and estimate the size of organizational capital for
the US manufacturing sector and …nd that it has a value of roughly 66 percent of physical
capital. While the broad interpretation of organizational capital and its accumulation is
similar, the details are quite di¤erent, especially there is no depreciation of past learning.
6learning-by-doing and its implications for aggregate output in response to
technology shocks are discussed in detail in Cooper and Johri (2002). The
paper o¤ers a detailed justi…cation for the modelling assumptions and a num-
ber of estimates of the learning technology at di¤erent levels of aggregation.
Each intermediate goodsproducerfacesa downward slopingdemand func-
tion for his product (3) which comes from the pro…t maximization problem
of the …nal goods producers discussed above. Prices are set by all producers
at the beginning of each period before the realization of the event st and can-
not be changed during the period once set. Thus there are two di¤erences
between the intermediate goods …rm’s problem in Chari-Kehoe-McGrattan
(2000) and this paper. First, the technology has been modi…ed to incorporate
learning-by-doing. Second, …rms set prices for one period in a synchronized
way which is a special case of their N period overlapping contracts structure
with N=1.
In period t, each producer chooses a price Pi(st¡1) and the level of orga-













subject to (3) and (6) where Q(st j st¡1) is the appropriate discount rate
to use to price revenue and costs in adjoining periods which is determined
in the household problem. V(st) denotes the real cost function which has
the real wage,w(st);the real rental rate on capital, r(st);Hi(st¡1) and Yi(st)














t)) ¸ Y : (9)












t)) = Y (11)
7from which the input demands can be obtained. Substituting these into (8)
yields the cost function: Taking Vi(st) as given, the solution to the maximiza-


















































F(st) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the organizational
capital accumulation equation once (3) has been used to substitute out for
Yi(st): The latter …rst order condition determines the optimal level of prices
to be set by the producer. Note that the state has been suppressed in this
equation except where it is needed to avoid confusion. Raising prices by one
unit causes output to fall since producers face downward sloping demand
curves for their product. The …rst term captures the net impact on current
revenue of the higher price but lower output, while the second term repre-
sents the current cost savings from producing less. The third term appears
because the producer realizes that he faces a forward looking problem due
to learning by doing. The accumulation equation for organizational capital
implies that a reduction of current period output will lead to a reduction in
organizational capital available tomorrow. The third term captures the value





Pit represents the reduction in output due to the higher price,
while ©0
Y(Hit;Yit) represents the reduction in Hit+1due to the reduction in
output which must be evaluated at ¸
F
t ; the marginal value of organizational
capital to the …rm.
Equation (12) determines the value of having available an additional unit
of organizational capital for use by the …rm in the following period. First,
the additional organizational capital improves pro…ts by reducing costs, as
captured by the second term on the right hand side (recall V 0
Hit+1 is negative).
Second, it adds to the ability of the organization to learn from production
thus raising future organizational capital. This additional organizational
capital has a value of ¸
F
t+1 for the …rm. All this must be discounted by the
price of one dollar in period t+1 in units of period t dollars. Alternatively
8one could say that the …rm sets prices so that the value of accumulating an
additional unit of organizational capital today is just equal to the discounted
value of organizational capital tomorrow.
The intuition in (12) and (13) suggests that …rms face a trade-o¤ between
current pro…ts and future pro…ts which is not present in the traditional price
setting problem. Charging a higher price today lowers the amount of or-
ganizational capital available tomorrow which raises future costs and lowers
future pro…ts. As a result, …rms will optimally select a lower price in the
presence of learning by doing than they would otherwise set. This can be













and noting that the second term appears only when the learning-by-doing
mechanism is present.
Note that each intermediate good …rm earns positive pro…ts even in the
presence of a constant returns to scale technology due to the accumulation
of organizational capital. However there is no entry or exit in this industry
by assumption.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by a large number of identical consumers whose
preferencesarede…ned overconsumption of …nal goods(C(st)), leisure (L(st))
and real money balances (M(st)=P(st)). Each consumer maximizes the sum
of discounted expected utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints
(given below) by choosing the optimal quantity of these goods to consume,
the amount of hours to work and how much to invest in physical capital
(K(st)) and one-period nominal bonds B(st+1) each period. They take as
given prices (P(st)), wages (w(st) ) and interest rates (r(st) ). If 0 < ¯ < 1






































t) · 1: (17)
In addition we need the sequence of borrowing constraints B(st+1) ¸ Bu for
some large negative value of Bu: Consumers lend out their stock of physical
capital and labor services to intermediate goods producers and receive wages
and interest income. Each of the nominal bonds, B(st+1); provides one dollar
in state st+1at the expense of Q(st+1 j st) dollars in state st. In addition they
receive ¦(st); the current pro…tsof intermediate goods producers as owners of
all …rms and T(st) the current real net transfers from the monetary authority.
The initial conditions K(s¡1);M(s¡1);B(s0) are also given.


































The interpretation of these …rst order conditions is quite standard. Equa-
tion (18) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure should equal the real wage rate while equation (19) is the usual
euler equation. Equation (20) states that the consumer should choose to
save nominal balances to the point that the current net bene…t of saving an
additional dollar (which is made up of the marginal utility lost due to lower
current consumption minus the marginal utility gained due to higher money
balances) is just equal to the discounted expected bene…t next period( com-
posed of the marginal utility of the extra consumption that can be bought
next period which in turn depends on the expected value of in‡ation over
this interval).





10where ¹(st) is a stochastic process. Consumers receive lump sumtransfers






In addition to these …rst order conditions from the consumer and …rm
problem we have market clearing conditions which require that the total
stock of capital supplied by consumers is equal to the sum of capital rented
by all intermediate goods …rms. Similarly the total hours of labor supplied by
consumers should equal the sum of labor hours demanded by all intermediate
goods …rms. Recall that while prices are chosen by …rms before uncertainty
about shocks is resolved, factor demands are chosen afterwards. Bond market




t) = Y (s
t) + (1 ¡±)K(s
t¡1): (24)
An equilibrium is a collection of allocations for consumers, C(st);N(st);
K(st¡1), B(st+1) and M(st); allocations for intermediate goods …rms: Ni(st);
Ki(st);Hi(st¡1) forall i 2 [0;1]; allocations for…nal goods…rms: Y (st);Y d
i (st)
for all i 2 [0;1]; together with prices w(st);r(st);Q(st+1 j st);P(st);Pi(st¡1);
for all i 2 [0;1] that satisfy the following conditions: i) taking prices as
given the consumer allocations solve the consumer’s problem; ii)taking all
prices but its own as given, each intermediate goods producer’s price and
stock of organizational capital satis…es (12) and (13); iii) taking prices as
given the …nal goods producers allocations solve the …nal goods producer
problem; iv) the factor market conditions and resource constraint hold and
the bond market clears. Only symmetric equilibria in which all consumers
and producers behave identically are studied.
3 Computation method and calibration
The model is solved usingthe method outlined in King and Watson (2002) us-
ing a linear approximation to the system of equations including the …rst order
conditions of the intermediate goods producers problem, the …rst order con-
ditions from the consumers problem, the production function, the resource
constraint for the economy and the accumulation equation for physical and
organizational capital. Some variables are growing in steady state - they are
rendered stationary by dividing by the stock of money in the economy.
11In order to simulate the economy, functional forms have to be speci…ed.














which also provides values for the parameters related to preferences. Fol-
lowing Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) I set ! = :94;and µ = :39 and
set Ãso that the fraction of the time endowment spent on working in steady
state is :3. Following Cooper and Johri (2002) ¯; the discount factor is set
to :984 while ±; the depreciation rate is set to :021, the value estimated in
Johri and Letendre (2004).9 Turning to the speci…cation of technology, in-
termediate goods producers are assumed to use a Cobb Douglas production






















Since the learning-by-doing technology is at the heart of the mechanism gen-
erating the sluggish response of prices I explore a range of values for the
parameters ";° and Á: These values are based on available estimates of these
parameters. Cooper and Johri (2002) provide estimates of a number of spec-
i…cations of the technology in (26) and (27) for the US manufacturing sector.
The estimates of " range fromaround .1to .49depending on whetherconstant
returns to scale was imposed on (27). The estimates of ° were concentrated
around .5 and went as high as .79 while Á was either set to 1-° or to 1. In a
related speci…cation of learning in the aircraft industry, Benkard (2000) …nds
that a doubling of production related experience can lead to a 36 percent
fall in unit labour requirements which corresponds to roughly " = :45: By
comparison the benchmark learning rate in the traditional learning litera-
ture (see Irwin and Klenow (1994)) is around 20 percent corresponding to
" = :263: However as discussed in Cooper and Johri and in Benkard, the tra-
ditional learning model imposes quite strong restrictions on the production
9Simulations show that the results are not sensitive to small variations in the above
parameters.
12of experience, corresponding to a linear version of (27) with all parameters
set to unity:
H(t+ 1) = H(t) + Y (t):
I set the labour share, ® = :6 in all speci…cations explored. The steady
state capital output ratio is a function of the technological parameters as
well as ¯;± and ´: As the learning-by-doing parameters are varied, ´ is set
to maintain the steady state capital output ratio at 10.6. The associated
steady state markup varies around 1% above marginal cost. The persistence
in the growth rate of money was set to .68, taken from Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2002).
4 Results
4.1 The dynamics of the price level
The main question addressed in this section is how much additional inertia
in the aggregate price level is generated by adding learning-by-doing to the
benchmark one period sticky price model when the economy is hit by money
growth shocks. I will focus on two measures that describe the additional
inertia added by these models over and above the benchmark one-period
sticky price model. The …rst measure is the autocorrelation between in‡ation
and its …rst lag (½¼). While this measure hides a lot of information about
di¤erences in the dynamics of prices across models, it is a useful summary
measure commonly reported in other studies. In addition, I will look at the
response of the price level to a one percent increase in the growth rate of
money. In the benchmark model, prices jump by 2.6 percent in the quarter
after the shock. In order to highlight the inertia generated by learning-by-
doing (lbd), I will report the number of quarters that it takes for the price
level to rise 2.6 percent above steady state for various speci…cations of the
lbd model.
Table 1 reports the …rst order autocorrelation coe¢cient of in‡ation and
the quarter in which the price level rises 2.6 percent above steady state for
various speci…cations of the model with learning-by-doing (lbd) as well as
the benchmark model without lbd. Row 1 of the table corresponds to the
benchmark model which generates a huge amount of inertia in in‡ation with
½¼ = :85: However, this result must be interpreted with caution because of
13the unrealistic behavior of investment in physical capital in response to an
increase in the growth rate of money. Impulse responses show that consumers
respond to a one percent increase in the rate of growth of money with a 176
percent increase in investment. The consequent rise in the capital stock
sharply curtails the rise in marginal costs for …rms which therefore raise
prices slowly. In order to curtail this unrealistic surge in investment, I add









where x(t) corresponds to investment in physical capital in period t. In all
speci…cations of the model, the adjustment cost parameter º was set to keep
the ratio of the standard deviations of investment and output equal to their
value in the US data. This modi…cation will ensure that the results are not
contaminated by an unrealistic increase in investment.
Row 2 of table 1 reports results for the benchmark model with adjustment
costs. Now ½¼ = :06; which shows the well known inability of the one-period
sticky price model to generate in‡ation inertia. As discussed above, the
second column reports that prices jump by 2.6 percent in quarter 2. The
next three rows look at various lbd speci…cations with increasing amounts of
persistence in in‡ation. Row 3 sets " = :263; which correspond to a learning
rate of 20 percent and sets ´ = Á = :5 while row 4 raises " to :45: Finally
row 5 lowers " back to .263 but raises Á to 1. The addition of learning-by-
doing to the sticky price model raises the in‡ation autocorrelation coe¢cient
by 166 percent to .16. This rises further in row 4 to .24 and .26 in row 5.
Learning-by-doing generates a slow moving price level for two reasons. First,
the additional output produced by …rms to meet the increase in demand
for their product leads to the accumulation of organizational capital. This
prevents future marginal costs from rising too quickly. Second, …rms wish to
take advantage of the high demand for their product to learn, and therefore
raise prices by less than marginal cost. The cumulative impact of these
e¤ects can be seen clearly in the response of prices to a money shock. The
third column of table 1 shows that it takes three additional quarters for
the price level to rise by 2.6% in row three compared to the benchmark
model. The speci…cation in row 4 generates even more inertia in the price
level: it takes until quarter 8 for prices to rise by that much. This rises
to quarter 11 in row 5, two and a half years after the initial shock to the
14economy. These results are quite sensitive to the curvature of the utility
function, controlled by ¾: For example, raising ¾ from 2 to 5, raises the
autocorrelation of in‡ation in the speci…cation in rows 4 and 5 to .63 and .88
(numbers reported in column two of table 1) respectively. The dramatic rise
in the persistence of in‡ation in response to ¾ can be understood as follows.
An increase in ¾; makes consumers more sensitive to the money shock leading
to a larger increase in demand for intermediate goods. A by-product of the
large increase in production of intermediate goods is the creation of a large
amount of organizational capital which puts downward pressure on real costs
causing nominal marginal costs to rise very slowly.
It is interesting to note the contrast in the behaviour of the …rm as we
raise ¾ : when it is low, …rms choose to raise prices less than marginal cost
increases whereas when it is high …rms raise prices by more than increases
in marginal cost. In order to understand this, recall that in the impact
period prices are …xed so …rms increase output to meet demand, creating
organizational capital for the next period. Organizational capital is valued
both because it reduces costs and because it improves the ability of the …rm
to learn. Depending on the size of the shock and the curvature in the learning
technology, the valueof organizational capital tothe …rmcan rise orfall which
will lead the …rm to set the change in prices by more or less than marginal
cost as suggested by equation (14). When the shock is small, …rms desire to
learn even more and further temper increases in prices to take advantage of
the temporarily high demand. In contrast when the shock is large so much
organizational capital has been accumulated in the impact period that it is
more pro…table to raise prices by more than marginal costs and slow down
the amount of learning. This attempt by the …rm to mitigate the e¤ect of
the demand shock by raising prices may be seen as a form of a …rm level
”wealth e¤ect”. Moreover we see that …rms respond to exogenous shocks to
demand by using prices to control the amount of learning that occurs.
4.2 Output and real variables
This section discusses the behaviour of real variables with an emphasis on
the dynamics of output. I begin by asking how much persistence in output
is generated by the lbd model when the only shock is a persistent increase in
the growth rate of money. As highlighted by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2000), models with staggered price setting have di¢culty generating realis-
tic output dynamics in response to money shocks. I then brie‡y ask if the
15lbd model is capable of generating second moments for real aggregate vari-
ables comparable to those seen in the US data. This discussion occurs in an
environment with both money and technology shocks.
Table 2 reports the autocorrelation of output with its …rst lag (½y): It
is evident from Row 1 that the benchmark model generates no persistence
in aggregate output (½y = :006): The lbd models all do a much better job
of propagating output over time. Row 2, (" = :263;° = Á = :5) generates
an autocorrelation coe¢cient of .21 while raising " to .45 in row three raises
½y to :44: In row 4 " is reduced back to .263 while Á is raised to 1 which
generates ½y = :56. The increase in persistence of output is reminiscent of
the results in Cooper and Johri (2002) and are easy to understand. The ad-
ditional organizational capital created by …rms in responding to the increase
in demand for their product raises future …rm productivity thus propagating
the e¤ects of the money shock forward through time.
Table 3 reports un…ltered theoretical second moments for the benchmark
model as well as the three speci…cations of the lbd model discussed above.
The corresponding moments for log-linearly detrended US data (taken from
Cooper and Johri (2002)) are reported in the last row. In all cases, the econ-
omy is hit with both money and total factor productivity shocks which are
uncorrelated with each other. The tfp shock has a …rst order autocorrelation
coe¢cient of .95 and a standard deviation of .007 while the money shock
has a standard deviation of .00498 which is the value used in Nelson (1998).
Looking across the rows of table 3, all the models do a good job of capturing
the basic features of business cycles. Consumption, hours and investment
are all procyclical and there is evidence of consumption smoothing. The var-
ious models also inherit some common problems: in all cases consumption is
more volatile than in the US data and too highly correlated with output. In
fact the behaviour of consumption is virtually identical in all rows of table 3.
Similarly, investment is too highly correlated with output in all the models of
table 3 relative to the data. The …rst clear di¤erences across models appear
when we study the behaviour of hours. The baseline model without learning-
by-doing generates too much relative volatility compared to the data. The
introduction of learning-by-doing in row 2 lowers the relative volatility of
hours from .9 to .67 which is much closer to the value seen in US data (.52).
Raising either " as in row 3 or Á as in row 4, further lowers the value of this
moment to about .5. This improvement comes at the expense of worsening
the correlation between hours and output which was already too low in the
benchmark model (.5) relative to the data (.71). The other stark di¤erence
16between the models is apparent in their ability to magnify and propagate
shocks over time. The autocorrelation of output, ½y is .75 in the benchmark,
takes a value of .88 in row 2 and further rises to .94 in rows 3 and 4 which
is very close to the value found in US data (.96). Similarly. the volatility of
output increases from .0325 in the benchmark case to .117 in row 4.
5 Conclusions
Learning-by-doing is introduced into a monetary dynamic general equilib-
rium model. In order to highlight the ability of the model to generate inertia
in the aggregate price level, all other sources of inertia commonly used in the
literature such as menu costs, staggered price or wage contracts are ignored.
The model therefore relies on the minimal amount of price stickiness needed:
prices are chosen before the shocks occur. A calibrated version of the model
generates considerable inertia in both in‡ation and output dynamics in re-
sponse to money growth shocks. The model also does reasonably well in
matching moments that capture key features of the US business cycle.
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20½¼;¾ = 2 ½¼;¾ = 5 quarter
no lbd, no adjustment costs .85
benchmark: no lbd .06 2
" = :263;Á = ° = :5 .16 .04 5
" = :45;Á = ° = :5 .24 .63 8
" = :263;Á = 1;° = :5 .26 .88 11
Table 1: Price-level inertia
½y
benchmark: no lbd .006
" = :263;Á = ° = :5 .21
" = :45;Á = ° = :5 .44
" = :263;Á = 1;° = :5 .56
Table 2: Output Persistence





benchmark: no lbd 0.92 1.31 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.50 0.75 0.0325
" = :263;Á = ° = :5 0.92 1.30 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.43 0.88 0.048
" = :45;Á = ° = :5 0.93 1.30 0.49 0.99 0.96 0.35 0.94 0.083
" = :263;Á = 1;° = :5 0.92 1.30 0.48 0.99 0.98 0.37 0.94 0.117
US Data 0.69 1.30 0.52 0.89 0.60 0.71 0.96 0.04
Table 3: Second Moments
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